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1. Introduction: recession of ‘nineties’ vs. the boom of ‘noughties’.
The first years of Post-Soviet transformation in Russia, which coincided with
the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, were by most accounts, a period of economic
chaos at the brink of failure which resulted in the collapse of Russian ruble in
19981.
According to calculations of the Economist Intelligence Unit, within seven
years after the beginning of economic transition Russia lost almost 30% of its real
gross domestic product (hereafter GDP), which is comparable to the decline in the
economy of the United States during the Great Depression2. The appalling rates of
consumer price inflation peaked at 2,500%3depreciated the savings of households
and despite the fact that some preferred hard assets and foreign currency as a
storage of value most Russian citizens lost their savings. The collapse of the
purchasing power of ruble led to its devaluation on the 1 January 1998.
Ineffective management, breaking down of old trading connections and the
eventual implementation of hard budget constraint led to a number of enterprises
going bankrupt. Between 1991 and 1998 the average level of industrial production
across the country fell by almost 52%4. Privatised enterprises effectively managed
by the new class of educated entrepreneurs adapted to the market conditions by
improving efficiency and cost reduction. These industrial and corporate changes
resulted in the rising long-term rate of unemployment which had its peak of
25.7% in 19935.
The level of foreign direct investment (hereafter FDI) was one of the lowest
among other economies in transition. In 1995 for instance, Russia attracted only
$345million of inward FDI stocks while the outflow of capital was $20.1 billion6.
Even though the country maintained positive trading balance since the collapse of
the Soviet Union it was low (the lowest in 1997 at $19.7 billion)7 taking into
account the size of the economy and the vast amount of tradable natural resources.
Those on the lowest incomes, including pensioners, teachers and families on
state benefits are always amongst the most vulnerable to economic recessions, and
face the highest risk of falling into poverty trap8. Even though, the level of those

1

Desai, p.49
Copper, p.2
3
Rosstat, available at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/prices/potr/2009/I-ipc.htm. Links to
Rosstat, OECD and all other websites were last accessed on 22 April 2011 and none were reported
to be broken as at that date.
4
Rosstat, available at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/business/prom/ind_prom_okved.xls
5
OECD, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/825635733410
6
Ibid, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/824532554644
7
Ibid, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/824347818584
8
Bronson et al, p.225
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who fell below the poverty line9 dropped initially at the onset of the reforms from
33.5% in 1992 to 22.4% in 1994, it remained stagnant for the next four years and
started to increase in 1998 reaching 29% in 2000. From the government’s point of
view, having such a large proportion of the least economically favoured people
means a potential threat in the elections. It is therefore understandable why
reformist Boris Yeltsin only marginally defeated the Communist Party of Russia
leader Gennady Zyuganov in 1996 Presidential Election, the outcome of which
had to be found out in the second round of voting10.
On December 31st of 1999 Yeltsin stepped down as a President of Russia and
the then Prime-Minister Vladimir Putin temporarily took charge as the head of the
country, later becoming the legitimate President after the election in 200011.
Elections of the new leader of Russia at the verge of the New Millennium were
associated with hope for economic stability, growth and prosperity of the people
who have long enough suffered from economic volatility, financial instability
following the crisis of 1998 and most importantly, uncertainty about the direction
which the country was heading. The dark page of the ‘nineties’ was turned over
and to begin a new era of economic discipline imposed by the rule of Vladimir
Putinin the ‘noughties’.
Indeed, the country has since demonstrated strong economic performance and
delivered good results. Good enough for Russia to be considered one of the
countries to ‘build better global economy’ along with India, China and Brazil.
Consumer inflation rate dropped from 20.2% in 2000 to 13.3% in 200812, which
was still high, but indicated a significant improvement, while the unemployment
decreased from 10.6% to 6.3%13. The volume of international trade (measured in
sum of total exports and imports) increased by a factor of 5.38 in US dollar
terms14 during the same time span15, while most of the industries showed
significant improvements in labour productivity in the same period of time16.
These are just a few of all economic indicators that led to Russian real GDP

9

Defined here as the share of population living on income below the minimum subsistence level
set by the government of Russian Federation.
10
Central Election Commission of Russia (hereafter CIKRF), available
athttp://www.cikrf.ru/banners/vib_arhiv/president/1996/index.html
11
CIKRF, available at http://www.cikrf.ru/banners/vib_arhiv/president/2000/index.html
12
Rosstat, available at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/prices/potr/2010/I-ipc.htm
13
Ibid, available at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/trud/trud6.xls
14
Ibid, available at
http://bi.gks.ru:8080/DDB/showcharts.jsp?report=voexim&project=BIPortal2.bip&width=1250
15
Kowitt.
16
Rosstat, available at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/vvp/pr-tru.xls
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growing at an annual average rate of almost 7%17 between 2000 and 2008. This is
a rate at which the size of the economy doubles every 10 years18.
At first glance this creates such a strong positive impression of Russian
performance, that one may be tempted to call it economic miracle. However, these
impressive facts and figures do not necessary represent either the standard of
living or the level of economic deprivation along with other indicators of people’s
welfare. Building on Jeremy Bentham’s idea that the ultimate goal of economic
policy should be to maximise social welfare19, one may find it useful to judge the
economic performance not just on the abstract figures indicating the quantitative
level of growth, but rather on how this growth has (if) increased the quality of
social well-being. This can be a rather complicated process and stretch to the point
of studies on happiness economics20, however, the most easily understandable and
perhaps the most fundamental of welfare indicators is the concept of poverty, on
which this work is concentrated.
The aim of this paper is to describe and assess the level of poverty per se along
with a few other social indicators in Russia for the period between 2000 and 2008
and to understand how significant was the effect of spectacular economic
performance Russia enjoyed in that period. There are several other reasons behind
the specific time frame chosen for this research. First, it coincides with the
Presidency of Vladimir Putin and one can evaluate social policy of ‘Putin’s era’
using this research. Secondly, figures for 2009 may not be good indicators
because of the effects of exogenous factors (global economic crisis) occurring in
that year and may contribute to wrong conclusions. Finally, most of the data used
comes from the Russian Federal Service of State Statistics (hereafter Rosstat)
which at the time this paper is written does not have some recent necessary data.
Section 2 of this paper will provide various definitions of poverty and
approaches to its measurement. We21 will then try to build a poverty profile in
Russia by outlining findings by several scholars in Section 3. In Section 4 we will
attempt to find relationships between poverty, inequality and economic growth
found by various scholars. Based on those results in the same section we will
outline our hypotheses to be tested. Section 5 will describe our approach to
hypotheses testing, while Section 6 will provide empirical results. We will finish
with a summary of key findings followed by a brief discussion and concluding
remarks in Section 7.

17

Rosstat, available at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/vvp/tab3.xls
“Rule of 72”: 72/7=10 years app.
19
Frey and Stutzer, p.2
20
As described by Frey and Stutzer, and Easterlin
21
Hereafter ‘we’ will refer to the author.
18
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2. Poverty: definitions and approaches.
Poverty is often divided into relative poverty – a condition of having fewer
resources than others in a society, and absolute poverty22, which has numerous
definitions by scholars from various institutions and non-governmental
organizations (hereafter NGOs). World Bank, for instance, defines poverty as
‘...pronounced deprivation in well-being, comprising many dimensions. It
includes low incomes and the inability to acquire the basic goods and services
necessary for survival with dignity. Poverty also encompasses low levels of health
and education, poor access to clean water and sanitation, inadequate physical
security, lack of voice, and insufficient capacity and opportunity to better one’s
life’23. A definition by the United Nations encompasses the same core
characteristics also adding susceptibility to violence as another feature24, while
Amartya Sen outlines the most basic capabilities essential to attaining a good
enough standard of living not to be deemed ‘poor’: ‘e.g., to meet nutritional
requirements, to escape avoidable disease, to be sheltered, to be clothed, to be
able to travel, and to be educated’25.Such broad definitions leave us with difficulty
and ambiguity in measuring the level of poverty.
According to Martin Ravallion26, poverty measurement assumes the existence
of pre-determined and well-defined standards of consumption – called ‘poverty
lines’, which act as a certain threshold that must be reached in order to avoid
falling under poverty qualification. These lines, therefore, represent a minimum
level of ‘acceptable’ economic participation27. The composition and structure of
poverty lines vary according to the economic policies of a given country. For
example, poverty line in the United States is a minimum-budget estimate for food
requirement multiplied by a factor of three, while poverty lines in India have
traditionally been based on the estimates of expenditure necessary to acquire a
minimum consumption of calories28. Rosstat does not provide a definition of
poverty; neither does it have the official poverty measurement. What it has on the
other hand, is the data for the share of people whose income falls below the
minimum subsistence level (i.e. living wage). The Federal Law of Russian
Federation defines minimum subsistence level as the price of the basket of
consumer goods, which consists of minimum amounts of food, non-food goods
and services necessary for preservation of health and survival, and additional

22

Hereafter ‘poverty’ will refer to absolute poverty.
World Bank, available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/0,,contentMDK:22569
747~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336992,00.html
24
Gordon, p.3
25
Sen, p.162-163
26
Ravallion, ‘Poverty Comparisons…’, p.25
27
Ray, p.250
28
Ibid
23
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compulsory fees and charges29. Therefore, according to the definitions presented
above, the use of the minimum subsistence level as the basis for poverty line is
justified.
United Nations (hereafter the UN) has other additional applied methods of
measuring poverty than just national poverty line. They see the proportion of
people with incomes less than the minimum subsistence level as a criterion for
general poverty, while the proportion of people with incomes less than 50% of the
minimum subsistence level is defined as a criterion for extreme poverty30. The
progress in achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals (hereafter MDGs)
in fighting poverty is measured by the proportion of people living on less than
$131 and $2.1532 a day. In addition to that, proportions of undernourished families
among all families with children and undernourished people in general are also
among the indicators MDG progress in fighting poverty.
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke33(hereafter FGT) derived a formula to measure
the level of poverty which possesses a number of useful properties and combines
information on the extent and intensity of poverty as well as the inequality among
the poor. The FGT index is a popular tool in building the poverty profile since it is
decomposable with population-share weights. It also allows assessing the
effectiveness of government social policy by measuring, for instance, the progress
made in helping groups with a high poverty risk in escaping poverty34.
There are many other widespread methods of measuring and estimating
poverty levels, each with its features and limitations, such as a Sen Index35.
Those, however, will not be used in this paper. It is also essential to add that some
of the characteristics of the poor are not accounted for many estimations and
indices. Most are concerned with the actual survival requirements, such as having
enough food and water, but none of those outlined above account for other
essential requirements of the poor, like housing, for example. It can be argued,
that poverty should not be measured and viewed just as the share of people with
incomes lower than certain threshold, but rather a holistic approach should be
taken. In this sense poverty can be assessed from the point of view of Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs, where fulfilling physiological needs is just a first step on the
way out of poverty, but a complete way out of poverty also goes through
realisation of safety, psychological, esteem and self-actualization needs36.
According to the indices described above, a person, who has enough income to

29

Rosstat, available at http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_14p/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/05-31.htm
National Human Development Report in the Russian Federation 2010 (hereafter UNDP), p.25
31
US dollars converted into rubles at purchasing power parity
32
US dollars converted into rubles at purchasing power parity
33
Foster et al, p.763
34
Kuznetcov and Nivorozhkina, p.233
35
Shorrocks, pp.1225-1226
36
Magnuson, ‘Development to Fulfill Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs.’
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feed himself and acquire basic goods and services, is not poor even if this person
has nowhere to live or cannot get good medical treatment simply because this
parameters are not accounted for in the basic poverty models. By looking at the
minimum subsistence level of 7,406 rubles37set for Moscow in 2009 and
comparing it to the housing rental rates in the same region it becomes clear, that
most of the living wage would be spent on renting one of the cheapest rooms in a
relatively low quality apartment38. Indeed, the structure of the minimum
subsistence level does not include any costs of housing; neither does it include the
costs of expensive medicines that many pensioners may require. Therefore, one
should understand the limitations of any official estimations of poverty levels and
do not treat them as the actual share of people in need. However, changes in those
levels may on the other hand indicate progress made in fighting poverty.
This paper will be assessing such progress by the methods outlined above:
Rosstat data on the share of people living on incomes below the minimum
subsistence level, MDG implementation progress and FGT index. In addition,
some housing, healthcare and education indicators will also be analysed briefly in
order to try to produce the real picture of the changing well-being of Russian
citizens.
3. Russian poverty: building a profile.
This section will provide a brief overview of poverty profile and a progress
made in the fight against it in Russia as seen by different scholars using different
approaches and measurement techniques outlined in the previous section.
The UN National Human Development Report 2010 (UNDP hereafter)
analyses general welfare trends in Russia between 2000 and 2008 and the impact
of policy measures designed to fight extreme poverty using Rosstat data. The
trends of poverty indicators are presented in Table 1. It should be noted, however,
that official statistics do not monitor extreme poverty and estimations presented in
this table are based on Q3 Household Budget Survey (HBS hereafter) which
excludes homeless families or people without fixed address. This leaves the most
vulnerable group of population out of this dataset and, therefore, the true scale of
extreme poverty phenomena in Russia are not known39.
There is evidence of progress made in achieving MDGs outlined in Section 2
of this work. The proportion of people living in extreme poverty on less than $1 a
day (at PPP) dropped from 1.1% in 2000 to 0.04% in 2008, while the share of
those living on less than $2.15 decreased from 8.3% to 1.4% in the corresponding
years. However, considering that one way ticket in Moscow Underground

37

Rosstat, available athttp://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_14p/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/05-10.htm
Rental prices are available at http://a-realt.ru/rent_flat/orders/search/zones/0/0/30
39
UNDP, p.29
38
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(Metro), for example, costs about $14041, the adequacy of extreme poverty lines
set at $2.15 and $1 a day at PPP is questionable to say the least. Therefore, one
may argue that national extreme poverty line set at half of the minimum
subsistence level is more applicable for indicating a more realistic extent of
poverty. The share of population living on incomes falling under that line
decreased by a factor of four from 16.7% in 2000 to 4.2% in 2008. This means
that the extreme form of poverty was mostly eradicated in the analysed period42.
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Proportion of people living on less
than, $1 a day (% of the population)

1.1

0.7

0.2

0.1

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.04

Development of the segment living on
less than $1 a day, 2000=100%

100

63

15

2

23

20

7

8

4

Proportion of people living on less
than $2.15 a day, (% of the
population)

8.3

5.6

3.6

2.7

2.5

2.1

1.1

0.4

1.4

Development of the segment living on
less than $2.15 a day, 2000=100%

100

67.6

43.0

32.8

30.5

25.5

13.0

5.3

17.1

Proportion of people with incomes less
than 50% of the minimum subsistence
level, (% of the population)

16.7

14.0

11.5

10.1

9.3

9.7

6.1

4.2

4.2

Development of the segment with
incomes less than 50% of the
minimum subsistence level,
2000=100%

100

83.9

68.8

60.2

55.5

58.1

36.3

24.9

25.0

Table 1. Development of general and national indicators of extreme poverty, selective HBS
data, Q3.
Source:UNDP

As was mentioned in Section 2, the national poverty line in Russia is set to
equal the minimum subsistence level. Figure 1 below outlines the trend in poverty
reduction based on this criterion and on poverty gap basis. The share of the
population with incomes below the minimum subsistence level halved between
2000 and 2008. Importantly, there is evidence of steady reduction year on year
indicating there is a trend and the estimations are not erratic throughout. Poverty

40

Moscow Underground fares are available at
http://old.mosmetro.ru/pages/page_0.php?id_page=87
41
As of 22.04.2011 $1=27.94 rubles, Central Bank of Russian Federation, available at
http://www.cbr.ru/
42
UNDP, p.30
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gap, defined as the average shortfall of the total population from poverty line,
narrowed from 5.0% in 2000 to 1.2% in 2008.
Overall, without getting into details of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy
and certain aspects of poverty profile in Russia, the picture drawn by UNDP
presents evidence of general pattern for poverty reduction in Russia.

Figure 1: Poverty rate and depth in Russia in 2000-2008.
Source: UNDP

In addition to the official figures on the level and extent of poverty, Kuznetcov
and Nivorozhkina43provide their own estimations using Russia Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey (RLMS hereafter) with household being the object of their
study. The period and properties they examined only partly coincide with those of
our interest, but nevertheless, there are some important aspects that should be
outlined.
Using FGT indices they estimate the proportion of population in poverty (α=0)
and average shortfall of per capita disposable income from the poverty line, i.e.
poverty gap (α=1). The results outlined in Figure 2 below are significantly
different from the official indicators presented for the corresponding period in
Figure 1. They explain this difference “by the fact that the poverty line used in the
analysis includes less poor individuals compared to the poverty line which is

43

Kuznetcov and Nivorozhkina, p.233
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based on the subsistence equivalent44”. They also claim to have a wider and more
consistent definition of poverty and define their poverty line at 50% of average
per capita disposable income.
Interestingly, not just the actual figures (which may differ depending on the
chosen measurement approaches and definitions) that are different, but also the
proportionate changes as well. According to official estimates, the share of
population below poverty line decreased by almost 40% between 2000 and 2005
as shown in Figure 1. The estimates by Kuznetcov and Nivorozhkina, however,
are less optimistic and report only a 15% reduction in the corresponding period of
time as seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Poverty rate and depth in Russia in 2000-2005.
Source: Kuznetcov and Nivorozhkina

Gerry, Nivorozhkin and Rigg45 use rounds 9-13 of RLMS for the period
between 2000 and 2004. Their main measure of poverty is based on regional
subsistence food basket adjusted for regional price variations. They do not
provide year-on-year estimations, but report a threefold poverty level reduction
from 30.5% in 2000 to 10.1% in 2004. Again, these estimates are somewhat
different from all other presented above and report the higher percentage change
in poverty rate of all. Their most crucial and fundamental finding for building a
poverty profile in Russia, however, is the ‘ruralisation’ of poverty. They

44

Ibid
Gerry et al, p.595

45
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decompose poverty rate under urban and rural to find that between 2000 and 2004
there was a 78.6% poverty reduction in urban areas and 47.3% in rural.
In general, the urban/rural divide is another type of inequality of distribution
where there is a bias usually in favour of urban population. Along with inequality
of income distribution to population in different income groups, the extent of this
bias affects whether the poorest in some remote areas benefit from economic
growth or not. If most of the economic gains occur and concentrate in the cities,
the rural community will be unlikely to benefit. And although, the general level of
poverty may be increasing as is reported in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the share of the
poor in rural areas may remain stagnant.
Distribution of wealth to population in different income groups has also been
far from uniform and there is some evidence of growing income gap. Figure 3
adapted from UNDP46 provides an overview of differentiation of income and
wages using Gini47 and Funds48 coefficients. Despite the observed trend of
convergence in the average level of wages measured by both Gini and Funds
coefficients, there has been a steady increase in the inequality level of incomes.
Between 2000 and 2008 Gini index for incomes increased by 7% along with a
26% increase in the Funds coefficient.

Figure 3: Differentiation of income and wages.
Source: UNDP

46

UNDP
Measure of statistical dispersion used to measure the inequality of distribution. Takes the value
of 0 where distribution is uniform, and 1 where there is maximum inequality.
48
Measure of social stratification defined as the income ratio between the highest earning decile
and the lowest earning decile.
47
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Summing up the evidence provided in this section, we can see that despite the
differences in poverty definitions and approaches to its measurement, there is a
consensus between the official statistics, data on extreme poverty by UNDP, FGT
indices calculated by Kuznetcov and Nivorozhkina and estimations by Gerry et al,
all of which show significant poverty reduction occurring since 2000, which is
fundamental for our discussion. The phenomena of rising income inequality along
with ‘ruralisation’ demonstrate important features of Russian poverty profile
which must shape Russian social policy agenda.
4. Growth and poverty: search for a relationship.
The level of success achieved in a fight against poverty in Russia coincided
with the period of strong economic performance. Figure 4 from UNDP49
summarises a significant progress made in raising real incomes, wages and
pensions, with each of the indicators increasing more than the national GDP in
between 2000 and 2009. Between 2000 and 2008 the economy grew by 60%
while real cash incomes more than doubled.

Figure 4: Progress of real average per capita cash incomes, wages and pensions, %
2000=100%
Source: UNDP

Yet, we have no grounds to claim that economic growth has been the driving
force behind poverty reduction without making empirical estimations. In this
section we provide an overview of literature on general connection between

49

UNDP, p.26
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poverty elimination and economic growth. The aim is to find whether economic
growth benefits the poor and if there is a consensus on this issue amongst scholars
and researchers. By the end of the section we will have outlined several
hypotheses to be tested and explained in further sections.
Even without getting deep into methodology and terminology of poverty and
growth one may simply realise that as the national income increases, the average
per capita income increases proportionately. This does not, however, mean or
represent the actual increase in the level of incomes of all citizens, since just a few
may benefit from growth due to unequal distribution of wealth. On the other hand,
those few, who benefit from such growth, may indirectly increase the wealth of
others by for example increasing the consumption of domestic goods and services,
which in turn will make its producers either increase their production and
expenditure or employ more labour force or both. Inputting more wealth into this
circular flow of income is likely to affect many participants of the economy but
the number and the share of those affected are the variables that determine the
level of inequality of income distribution.
Analysis of how an increase in GDP affects incomes and consumption of the
most deprived helps to understand whether economic growth is good for the poor
(pro-poor growth hereafter) or not (anti-poor growth hereafter50). Martin
Ravallion51 quotes two opposing sides of a debate on whether the poor benefit
from economic growth: ‘Growth really does help the poor: in fact it raises their
incomes by about as much as it raises the incomes of everybody else… In short,
globalization raises incomes, and the poor participate fully (The Economist, May
27, 2000, p.94)’ and ‘There is plenty of evidence that current patterns of growth
and globalization are widening income disparities and hence acting as a brake on
poverty reduction (Justin Forsyth, Oxfam Policy Director, Letter to The
Economist, June 20, 2000, p.6)’.
The two conflicting opinions, however, are to some extent justified as the
analysis by Ravallion proves. To test whether the poor share the growth in the
average living standards he uses data sets for private consumption expenditure
(PCE hereafter) per capita from the national accounts (NAS hereafter) and on the
other hand, survey on average household living standards. Both approaches have
their caveats and certain advantages, and do not agree in general either in the
levels or in their growth rates, which again shows that much depends on the
chosen definitions of poverty and methods of its measurement52.
Ravallion finds that in both data sets there is either little or no correlation
between growth in average per capita income and the change in measured

50

The Political Economy of pro-poor growth’, p.3
Ravallion, ‘Growth…’, p.1803
52
Ibid, p.1804

51
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inequality. There is low correlation of -.09 between the annualized log of Gini
coefficient and the annualized change in the log of the survey mean income, but it
is even lower when using growth rates in consumption from NAS (0.01). This is
consistent with previous evidence found by Ravallion and Chen53 of the
uncorrelated relationship between growth and inequality, and with findings by
Dollar and Kraay54, who showed that the elasticity of income of the poor (change
in log mean income of the 1st Quintile55to the change in log GDP per capita) is
close to 1 and varies slightly depending on the regression method chosen.
Therefore, one can conclude that that share of the poorest quintile is uncorrelated
with GDP per capita.
However, this does not imply that incomes of the poor change as much as the
incomes of the rich. In proportion terms an increase in income may be equivalent
across the population groups decomposed by income. In money terms, on the
other hand, the gain for the poor is lower than the gain for the rich. Suppose
average income in economy X changes from 1 to 2, i.e. doubles, while
distribution proportions remain the same. Assume that for example the poor had
5% of total income before and they get 5% after the average income doubles.
Similarly, the share of the rich remains constant at 50%. Hence, before an increase
in the average income level the poor had 0.05, while the rich had 0.5. After an
while the rich get
. Therefore,
increase the poor get
rich got richer by 0.5, while the poor got richer only by 0.05.
This simplified simulation shows that given existing inequality, income gains
of the rich are greater than income gains of the poor despite the distribution
neutral growth. Nevertheless, given the unchanged distributional shares, the poor
still gain in absolute terms: growth reduces poverty, while contraction causes its
increase56.
Proportionate changes in the $1/day poverty rate (at Purchasing Power Parity,
hereafter PPP) are plotted against the proportionate changes in the survey mean
income on Figure 5, which is constructed using data for 47 developing countries
in the 1980s and 1990s57.The regression line of the best fit passes through the
origin, which means that at zero growth there is no poverty reduction. Since both
axis are annualized changes in the logs, the slope of -2.50 (with standard error on
0.30 and R-squared=0.44) can be interpreted as the “growth elasticity of
poverty”58. This implies that for every 1% increase in the average income, there is
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Hereafter 1st Quintile will refer to the share in total income by the poorest 20% of the population,
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Ravallion, ‘Growth…’, p.1806
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Ibid
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Ibid

54

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2011

13

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 8 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 4

a 2.5% poverty reduction (as measured by the proportion of those living on below
$1/day at 1993 PPP). As can further be seen from the graph, there is no evidence
that elasticity depends on which way the mean moves.

Figure 5: Poverty and mean household income.
Source: Martin Ravallion ‘Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages’

The relationship is similar using PCE per capita from NAS, although, the
coefficient is weaker (-1.96) and has a higher standard error (0.89), although is
statistically significant at 3%.
Figure 6 based on World Bank’s Development Indicators 2003, constructed by
Hayami and Godo59compares FGT poverty indices and average GDP per capita
for 44 countries. The upper graph plots head-count index (hereafter HCI)
measured by the share of people living on below $1/day (at PPP) against the
average per capita GDP, while the lower graph represents poverty gap index
(hereafter PGI) measured by the sum of differences in poor people’s incomes
from poverty line plotted also against average GDP per capita. In both cases there
is obvious negative relationship between poverty and GDP per capita with
correlation coefficients of -0.85 for HCI and -0.82 for PGI.
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Figure 6: International comparison of absolute poverty.
Source: Yujiro Hayami and Yoshihisa Godo ‘Development Economics. From the…’

Using the same datasets, Hayami and Godo ran linear regressions, where HCI
and PGI were dependent variables and took logistic forms, i.e.
and
, while independent variables were logs of
average GDP per capita across countries.
The estimated coefficients appeared to be negative and statistically significant
in both cases, indicating a decline in poverty levels following an increase in the
average per capita GDP. There are caveats of this analysis, however, related, first
to the static cross-country data used without adding any time dimension, and
second, to a not wide enough range of values and the number of countries
analysed. Nevertheless, within the data range of World Development Indicators
2003 Hayami and Godo find evidence to support their hypothesis that “prevalence
of poverty among all people in society (as measured by HCI) as well as the degree
of poverty among poor people (as measure by PGI) tend to decline monotonously
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corresponding to increases in average GDP per capita…”60. They conclude that
low levels of average GDP per capita is the fundamental cause of poverty, and
therefore, achieving rapid economic growth is vital for developing countries with
a desire of poverty reduction.
By adding regional and central planning dummies to the same regression
Hayami and Godo61 assess the effects of inequality along with average GDP per
capita. Central planning dummy has negative coefficients which may be
explained by the lower levels of inequality associated with this type of economic
regime, while coefficients for Africa and Latin America are positive and
statistically significant, potentially implying that the level of poverty is
“influenced by inequality, which is determined as a part of the economic and
social system formed historically through the choices of economic policies and ad
hoc social and political events such as colonialism in the past62”. So, when
estimating the explanations for poverty using regressions one has to also account
for factors other than average income.
In general, there is to a large extent a consensus between several contemporary
scholars, like Dollar and Kraay63, Ravallion64, Hayami and Godo65 amongst others
who show and prove that growth is good, and even essential for poverty
reduction. This does not imply, however, that growth necessarily benefits the poor
as much as it benefits the rich, as it was outlined above. Neither does it mean that
growth is the only factor affecting poverty levels; although, using the arguments
and evidence of data presented by these scholars one can argue that growth is the
fundamental one.
These findings, however, are based on aggregate cross-country empirical
estimations and applying these blindly to Russia in our case and arguing that the
growth experienced in the period between 2000 and 2008 must have been the
driving force behind the poverty reduction would be unjustified. In order to
achieve our aim of finding the effects of economic performance during the
analysed period, we need to check and test several hypotheses.
The most general and perhaps the most significant is the “growth elasticity of
poverty” tested by Ravallion and Chen66 on a cross-country level. Our original
hypothesis, justified by the aforementioned findings, is that growth in the average
per capita GRP negatively affects poverty levels.
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Our second hypothesis to be tested also stems from the claim by Ravallion that
there is either little or no correlation between growth in average money income
and change in inequality67. The application of this hypothesis for Russia will be
tested.
As was mentioned in Section 2 of this paper, measuring poverty simply by a
number of people or households whose incomes fall behind certain consumption
threshold may be misleading in a way that it does not show the overall picture of
the social well-being. In addition to the hypotheses above, it will be tested
whether economic growth of 2000-2008 positively affected other social indicators
like housing, education, and healthcare, since a person who is deprived of access
to any of these has justifications to be deemed ‘poor’.
5. Data and methodology.
a. Data
The data used for testing the outlined hypotheses and finding empirical
estimations in this study comes from Rosstat publications and from their official
web-site68. There have been recent concerns among scholars and researchers
regarding the reliability of data published by Rosstat69. Nevertheless, this is the
official statistics used for assessing the performance by government officials and
policy makers and its use is justifiable, especially given no alternative regional
indicators. But one has to keep in mind its limitations.
As of January 2011, the are 83 regions in the Russian Federation that include
oblasts, krais, republics, autonomous okrugs and two cities of federal
subordinations – Moscow and Saint-Petersburg. Most models and regressions to
follow will be based on figures for all regions apart from Chechen Republic due to
the unavailability of data for several years years; Kamchatka Krai/Oblast, due to
the difficulty in measurements after Kamchatka Oblast merged with Koryak
Autonomous Region in 2007; Zabayakalsky Krai/Chita Oblast/Agin-Buryat
Autonomous Okrug, due to the same problem after the latter two merged to
become the former; Khanty-Mansi Autonomous region, Yamalo-Nenets
Autonomous Okrug, and Nenets Autonomous Okrug, all due to the uncalculated
gross regional products (GRP) for autonomous regions because of the
incommensurability of data on average constantly residing population and the
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results of economic activity performed in the region70. There are therefore 77
regions used in the analysis of the 2000-2008 period.
Gross regional product (hereafter GRP) per capita, income per capita and
government spending are presented by Rosstat in nominal terms only; therefore
they are converted into constant 2000 prices using regional consumer price index
(hereafter CPI). The caveat of such approach is the excludability of price changes
for certain goods and services that may have significant weight in expenditure
lists of both households and governments. Nevertheless, it is the most applicable
approach in our case, since it would be insensible to apply two different inflation
indices for government and household as well as it would not make much sense to
account for increasing housing prices, for instance, in estimating real household
incomes. In any of the indices estimated hereafter 2000 is taken as the base year.
b. Methodology.
In order to test the first most fundamental hypothesis of this study we estimate
the growth elasticity of regional poverty. We then also add regional and time
binary variables to see whether there are certain regions and years where poverty
explanations are significantly different from the other. In order to test for
elasticity we take the logarithms of dependent and explanatory variables. The
basic model party adapted from the works by Takeda71as follows:

In order to try to improve the goodness of fit we gradually add some other
explanatory variables as suggested by Takeda72 to get the following:

where
is poverty rate in region i (i=1, …, N) at year t (t=1, …, T);
is the growth elasticity of poverty coefficient;
unknown intercept;
a the real per capita GRP in region i (i=1, …, N) at year t (t=1, …, T);

is the
is
is the
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government spending elasticity of poverty coefficient;
is the real
government spending per capita in region i (i=1, …, N) at year t (t=1, …, T); is
(i=2, …, N)73;
is a coefficient
a coefficient for the regional binary repressor
for the binary time regressor
(t=2, …, T)74; is an individual unobserved
effect for region i (i=1, …, N);
is an error term in region i (i=1, …, N) at year t
(t=1, …, T).
Apart from that, we split our data into two different periods: 2000-2004 and
2005-2008 to see whether the patterns are significantly different. For a period of
1999-2002 Takeda75 reported a significant drop in growth elasticity of poverty76,
so we also separately estimate this indicator for 2000-2002 to check if its similar
to estimations by Takeda who used a slightly different model. We also try
splitting the regions into two groups: 38 with highest poverty rates and 39 with
lowest poverty rates as of 2000 to see whether there are signs of convergence.
To test our second hypothesis we use Rosstat’s regional Gini and Funds
coefficient indicators and check for correlation between annualized changes in the
logs of Gini and Funds indices and the annualized changes in the logs of average
money income per capita for 2002-200877. We also correlate changes in the logs
of the share of total money income for different income groups (quintiles) to
changes in the logs of mean income per capita for 2000-2008.We further test the
relationship of changes in the log shares of incomes of each of the quintile groups
and changes in the logs of Gini and Funds indices to the changes in the log mean
money income per capita. The simple models as follow:

is the share of income of the xth income quintile group (1, …, X; 1st
where
quintile represents 20% of population with the lowest incomes, 5th quintile
represents 20% of population with the highest incomes) in region i (i=1, …, N) at
year t (t=1, …, T);
is a Gini index for region i (i=1, …, N) at year t (t=1, …,
is a Funds index for region i (i=1, …, N) at year t (t=1, …, T);
T);
is the income elasticity coefficient; and
is the real income
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per capita accounted for CPI in region i (i=1, …, N) at year t (t=1, …, T).All other
variable are as above (equations 1-4).
To test our final hypothesis we attempt to find the relationship between
increasing GRP per capita and other social indicators. In particular, we test
whether economic growth significantly affected those in need of housing. There
are two housing indicators we find useful for analysis: absolute number of those
registered as in need of housing and absolute number of those who used to be
registered as in need of housing but acquired or improved housing in a given year
in a given region. Considering that government usually plays a pivotal role in
provision of social housing and other essential public goods we again add mean
government spending per capita to our estimations as another explanatory
variable.
We then test whether economic growth and government spending led to
increasing numbers of students in professional and higher education per 10,000 of
population. This stems from a logical assumption that as the productivity in the
economy increases, the demand for highly-skilled labour is also likely to increase.
And also, if some part of the increasing real government spending is devoted to
promotion and development of higher and professional education the numbers of
students should be on the rise.
Our last indicator of changes in social welfare is healthcare provision and its
relationship with growth in real per capita GRP and government spending. Given
ambiguity in measuring the quantity and quality of healthcare services, we only
pick the most crucial variables, such as the number of hospital beds and doctors
per 10,000 people to measure ‘quantity’; and the number of sicknesses78 per
10,000 people to measure ‘quality’ in healthcare provision79.
To test this hypothesis we use similar approaches as described in the beginning
of this section (equation 2). Most models have certain caveats and are not
unconditionally reliable in estimating the exact numerical relationships and they
are not supposed to be. Therefore, the models presented in this study do not claim
to find perfectly accurate empirical estimations, but rather analyse the general
trend and the significance of certain factors and effects.
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6. Empirical results.
Hypothesis 1: Growth is good for the poor.
Full details of our estimations using ordinary least squares (hereafter OLS),
fixed effect (hereafter FE) and random effect (hereafter RE) are presented in
Tables 2A-23A80 of the Appendix section. We do not aim do provide an exact and
most appropriate estimation result and will not therefore test which of the three
estimations best fits the data, but we shall rather outline the trends and discuss
hypothetical limitations of our models.
We start with our first and most fundamental hypothesis and test whether
economic growth of 2000-2008 has been of benefit for the poor of Russia. We
find three different statistically significant estimations of growth elasticity of
poverty for our first model (equation 1). The pooled OLS estimation and a twoway scatter diagram on Figure 7 below represent the least optimistic results of the
three estimations but still report a relatively high coefficient of -0.5195 (R-square
= 0.5252). This means that across 77 regions in a given time period for every 1%
increase in the average GRP per capita there has been a 0.5195% decrease in
poverty level. Using FE and RE models we find these coefficients to be
1.1088 and -0.9744 (same overall R-squared = 0.5259) respectively all significant
at 1% significance level. Full details can be found in Table 2A.

80
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4.5

Regional Poverty Rate and Real GRP per capita, 2000-2008
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Figure 7: Regional poverty rate and real GRP per capita, 2000-2008.
Source: Author’s estimations.

We then add average real (nominal accounted for CPI inflation) government
spending to our models to improve the goodness of fit as suggested by Takeda81,
that does not however change either the results or the goodness of fit radically.
The results are outlined in Table 3A. For OLS, FE and RE we get statistically
significant at 1% level growth elasticity of poverty coefficients of -0.5717 (Rsquared = 0.5307), -1.0448 (overall R-squared = 0.5200) and -0.8753 (overall Rsquared = 0.5168) respectively. With regard to government spending elasticity of
poverty the results are as follows: 0.0711 for OLS, -0.0606 for FE and -0.0745 for
RE. Interestingly, the OLS estimation has a positive coefficient, while for the
other two it is negative. But there is no reason to assume that increasing
government expenditure can also contribute to increase in poverty.
We then split our time frame into two periods - 2000-2004 and 2005-2008
(Tables 4A and 5A), to check which has been more ‘productive’ in poverty
reduction. Findings show that during the earlier period positive changes in
average GRP per capita and, more importantly in this case, positive changes in
average per capita government spending have been more pro-poor than in the later
period. In particular, using OLS we find -0.5274 (R-squared = 0.5384) for 2000-
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2004 and -0.5063 (R-squared = 0.4420) for 2004-2008; -1.0429 (overall Rsquared = 0.4838) and -0.7517 (overall R-squared = 0.3843) using FE; -0.7033
(overall R-squared = 0.4881) and -0.5750 (overall R-squared = 0.3827) using RE,
all in favour of the earlier period. There are two interesting features of these
estimations: first, the goodness of fit as measured by R-squared is much lower for
the later period, and second, the coefficients for government spending are either
insignificant or less significant when using FE and RE models for 2005-2008. In
theory this could mean a switch of social policies away from direct welfare
support. With OLS estimations, government spending elasticity of poverty has
positive values for both periods, so we disregard it, since it is not realistic.
Table 6A summarizes the results we obtained for 2000-2002 in order to
compare with Takeda’s82 estimations for 1999-2002. We get different statistically
significant results using our models than those obtained by Takeda. For growth
elasticity of poverty we get -0.4915 (overall R-squared = 0.3648) using FE
compared to -0.195 (overall R-squared = 0.34) found by Takeda; and -0.4360
using RE (overall R-squared = 0.4546) compared to Takeda’s -0.336 (overall Rsquared = 0.54). With regard to the effect of government spending we get -0.2968
and -0.0970 for FE and RE respectively compared to -0.322 and -0.198 found by
Takeda. The difference can be explained by the exclusion of year 1999 in our
estimations. With this explanation in mind we conclude that the process of
poverty elimination has been more effective since 2000, and economic growth has
been more pro-poor since then.
In order to finally confirm that the growth which occurred in the period
between 2000 and 2008 was pro-poor we test for growth elasticity of poverty
separately for regions with lowest and highest poverty rates as of 2000. List of
regions belonging to the two groups can be found in Table 1A. Analysing the
results we obtained from running this regression one can see that growth in real
per capita GRP in regions with higher poverty was associated with stronger
poverty reduction as measured by growth elasticity of poverty. For 38 regions
which had the higher levels of poverty in 2000 we obtained the following results:
-0.5358 using OLS (R-squared=0.4531), -1.2024 using FE (overall Rsquared=0.4547) and with RE we got -1.0604 (overall R-squared=0.4547), all
statistically significant under 1% level. Results for 39 regions with lowest level of
poverty as of 2000 in the same order: -0.4158 (R-squared=0.4214), -0.4231
(overall R-squared=0.4231) and -0.8690 (overall R-squared=0.4231). This
provides us with evidence that economic growth in poorer regions was associated
with about a 20% higher poverty reduction rate when compared with the richer
regions and there are therefore signs of convergence.
We also added regional and time dummies (equation 3 and 4) to find no
uniformity across regions in their binary indicators with majority being positive. It
82
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may come as a surprise that regions like Republic of Ingushetia and the Republic
of Dagestan usually associated with higher levels of unemployment and instability
both have negative regional dummies. This can be explained by a huge drop in
official poverty rates (eg. from 72.6% in 2000 to 10.1% in 2008 for Dagestan), but
accuracy of these indicators is questionable. Nevertheless, details of this
regression are summarized in Table 9A. In Table 10A there are also added time
binary variables, values of which decrease year on year confirming a steady
decline of population living below poverty line throughout the analysed period.
The results obtained and explained above, we believe, are sufficient to support
our first hypothesis and so we claim that growth of average per capita GRP
experienced between 2000 and 2008 negatively and significantly affected poverty
levels. With support of the results obtained after splitting the tested regions into
more and less poor and finding stronger effect on regions with higher poverty
levels as of 2000, we further conclude that economic growth associated with the
aforementioned period was pro-poor. One, however, has to keep in mind
limitations of the official definition of national poverty line.
Hypothesis 2: Growth does not affect inequality.
Here we test relationships between growth in money income and inequality,
which were found to be uncorrelated by Dollar and Kraay83 and Ravallion84. We
first check for relationships between average real income per capita85 and income
shares of each of the quintile groups from poorest to richest. Table 2 represents a
correlation matrix between the outlined variables.
Real
GRP per
capita
1.0000

1st
Quintile
(poorest)

2nd
Quintile

3rd
Quintile

4th
Quintile

5th
Quintile
(richest)

Real GRP per
capita
-0.6918
1.0000
1st Quintile
(poorest)
-0.6644
0.9883
1.0000
2nd Quintile
-0.6283
0.9648
0.9917
1.0000
3rd Quintile
th
-0.4843
0.8120
0.8785
0.9279
1.0000
4 Quintile
th
0.6943
-0.9977
-0.9815
-0.9542
-0.7915
1.0000
5 Quintile
(richest)
Table 2: Correlation matrix between real GRP per capita and income shares of population
quintiles.
Source: Author’s estimations
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Contrary to the observations by Ravallion and Dollar and Kraay we find strong
correlation between income and inequality. In particular, as can be seen from the
above correlation matrix, growth in income levels is associated with decreasing
income shares of each of the quintile groups apart from the richest. It can also be
seen that correlation increases with each quintile implying that the poor are the
least to benefit from the rising average income levels. This does not contradict our
previous finding of economic growth causing a decline in poverty levels, but it
rather shows that despite the poor getting more in real terms, their share falls as
the “pie” gets bigger.
We also checked for relationship between income and official figures on Gini
and Funds coefficients for 2002-2008 and found strong positive correlation of
0.7073 between Gini index and income; and of 0.7091 between income and Funds
index. This illustrates that rising income levels are associated with rising
inequality in Russia.
Regression analysis of increasing average income on income shares of each of
the population quintiles (equation 5) yielded interesting results summarised in
Tables 11A-15A. There is evidence of significant positive relationship between
income growth and inequality measured by income shares of each of the quintile
groups. In order for distribution of economic gains to be uniform, the coefficients
have to be close to zero, which is not the result of our analysis. We find that only
the richest 20% of the population increase their share in total average income,
while all other group lose, with the poorest 20% losing the most. It can also be
seen that apart from the 1st quintile having the lowest elasticity of income share
coefficient, the model has one of the highest goodness of fit indicators with OLS,
FE or RE R-squared being 0.4778 (adjusted), 0.4785 (overall) and 0.4785
(overall) respectively. In terms of R-squared it only loses to the 5th Quintile,
which means that the proportions of variability accounted for in the dataset are the
highest for the richest quintile followed by the poorest quintile. These are
worrying signs indicating economic divergence.
Tables 16A and 17A outline regression results of income on Gini and Funds
indices for 2002-2008. We estimate all regression coefficients to be positive and
significant under 1% level for each model. We find that for every 1% increase in
income there is 0.4001% (adjusted R-squared=0.5035), 0.3925% (overall Rsquared=0.5044) and 0.3929% (overall R-squared=0.5044) increase in Funds
coefficient when applying OLS, FE and RE models respectively. So, effectively
about a 2.5% increase in GRP leads to a 1% increase in the Funds coefficient and
since it represents an average income ratio of the highest earning decile to the
lowest
earning
decile,
i.e.
, the obtained
results ultimately mean that either the highest earners increase their average
income by 1% while income of the lowest earners remains the same; or it is the
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lowest earners who have their income reduced by 0.9% ceteris paribus for every
2.5% increase in average income. In any case, this shows that lowest earners lose
relative to the highest earners. As for the Gini coefficient, it increases by 1% for
about every 6.6% increase in income as we estimate regression coefficients for
OLS, FE and RE to be 0.1470 (adjusted R-squared=0.4994), 0.1545 (overall Rsquared=0.5003) and 0.1538 (overall R-squared=0.5003) respectively. Gini and
Funds indices are highly correlated with a coefficient of 0.9772.
We find enough evidence to reject our original hypothesis and state that as the
average incomes rises, inequality in Russia increases. This contrasts with some
findings outlined in Section 4.Ravallion and Chen86 did find positive relationship
between inequality and growth in income levels in Eastern Europe, however the
effect was estimated to be insignificant.
Hypothesis 3: Growth is associated with improvements in other social wellbeing indicators -education, housing and healthcare.
As the economy increases in size, the demand for skilled labour is also likely to
increase. Rosstat data supports this claim with data on increasing number of
students across regions. However whether growth per se is the reason behind the
increasing education enrolment numbers is not clear. Our estimate of correlation
between log of annualised average GRP per capita and log of number of students
in higher and professional education is 0.3673. However, regression analysis does
not provide strong evidence of economic growth significantly affecting education.
Despite the coefficients of 0.2042 using OLS, 0.0524 using FE and of 0.0522
using RE all being significant under 1%, the models are weak due to low
goodness of fit as measured by R-squared. The results are outlined in Table 18A.
We faced the same problem when conducted a regression of average GRP per
capita and government spending on the annual number of people who acquired
housing and improved housing conditions; and on the number of people registered
as in need of housing. We found no significant evidence of either GRP or
government spending positively affecting housing conditions across Russian
regions between 2000 and 2008. Despite some coefficients being strong and
significant we cannot use them for explanations due to their low goodness of fit.
Nevertheless, estimations are listed in Tables 19A and 20A.
Testing for relationship between GRP and improvements in “quantity” and
“quality” of healthcare did not yield trustworthy results either. There is evidence
of falling number of hospital beds per 10,000 people, however, despite having
strong and significant coefficients, economic growth and government spending
account for more than 7% of variation as seen in Table 21A. We had better
goodness of fit when regressed GRP and government spending indicators on
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number of doctors per 10,000 people with overall and adjusted R-squared of about
0.18 when using OLS, FE and RE models but found low coefficients of 0.1614,
0.0702 and 0.0714, all listed in Table 22A. Economic growth and government
spending also fail to explain the rising number of diagnosed new diseases per
10,000 due to the lack of evidence as summarised in Table 23A. However,
increasing sickness level per se and its positive correlations of 0.4231 with
average GRP per capita and of 0.3198 with real government spending per capita
should be a worrying indicator for Russian policy makers.
Therefore, despite these social indicators changing both ways, there is not
enough evidence that either economic growth or increasing government spending
in Russia between 2000 and 2008 were the forces behind these changes.
7. Concluding remarks.
Summing up the above said, there are three important findings of our analysis:
a) Growth in real per capita GRP has been associated with reduction of official
poverty levels across Russia throughout the period between 2000 and 2008.
b) Growth in real money incomes has been accompanied by widening inequality
measured by increasing Funds and Gini coefficients, and by the rising income
share of the richest quintile group of population.
c) Steadily increasing real per capita GRP and government spending have not
acted as the main catalysts for changes in housing provision, professional and
higher education levels as well as ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ of healthcare.
Therefore, based on Rosstat data we can claim that poverty has been
decreasing at a high rate and our calculations support the hypothesis that the
growth was pro-poor. On the other hand, a big problem associated with Russian
economic development was the rising level of income inequality. This
phenomenon requires further analysis in order to draw policy recommendations,
but we attempt to outline some hypothetical reasons.
It is essential to note the inverted-U-shape hypothesis on income distribution
first pointed out by Simon Kuznets87. He considered initial increases in inequality
levels in the early stage of development followed by their gradual reductions.
There is no empirical regularity to firmly support this proposition88 but one can
speculate and suggest that during the analysed period Russia might have been at
the stage of development, where inequality is on the rise and gradual reductions
are to follow.
Figure 4 previously demonstrated in Section 3 shows high differentiation of
wages, which according to UNDP contributes to overall high income
differentiation and is caused by budget sector wages, the pension system and
87
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social support programmes growing more slowly than wages in market-driven
sectors89. Despite the indicator decreasing, it still remains high and above overall
income differentiation. Low mobility of labour between industrial sectors might
impede the wage catch-up process in sectors with slower rates of development and
productivity growth. Worsening obstacles to small and medium size
entrepreneurship outlined in World Bank’s Doing Business Report90 ‘deincentivise’ from seeking alternative sources of incomes while difficulty in getting
micro-credit prevent the least privileged from economic participation.
Keeping in mind the conclusion made by Gerry et al. that poverty has become
a largely rural phenomenon91 (hence the growing income differentiation between
urban and rural population), institutional development must play a pivotal role in
reducing inequality. Rule of law, property protection, financial deregulation and
less state intervention are the likely factors to contribute to greater equality.
Applying redistribution measures, such as a move away from flat to progressive
income tax system and increasing inheritance tax from 13%92, accompanied by
increases in budget sector wages might underlie equalisation in income
distribution. Improvement of social insurance and social support systems along
with a development of micro-credit infrastructure will facilitate economic activity
among the underprivileged. Nevertheless, the problem needs further empirical
investigation before making certain conclusions.
While we have not found any empirical relationship between several social
indicators and economic growth mentioned in the previous section, we can still
outline significant progress made in achieving greater number of higher and
professional education students – an average 44% increase between 2000 and
200893; and a 34% reduction in number of people registered as in need of housing.
Despite a 6% increase in the number of doctors per 10,000, policy makers should
worry about a 13% reduction in number of hospital beds per 10,000 accompanied
by a 6% increase in a number of diagnosed illnesses.
We finally conclude that although there are clear sings of poverty levels per se
decreasing with economic growth, evidence of improvement of social wellbeing is
ambiguous. A further study on problems and causes of inequality and an in-depth
analysis of social indicators are needed to draw a more complete picture of the
evolving standards of living in Russia.
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Table 9A: Regression of poverty for Russia in 2000-2008
Pooled OLS/ Random Effect (RE)
Coef.
Std.error t-value
Log of real GRP per capita
-1.0448 *** 0.0283
-36.9200
Log of real Gov.spending per
-3.1700
capita
-0.0606 *** 0.0191
Constant
14.3334 *** 0.2079
68.9500
Region
Altai Republic
Amur Oblast
Arkhangelsk Oblast
Astrakhan Oblast
Belgorod Oblast
Bryansk Oblast
Chelyabinsk Oblast
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug
Chuvash Republic
Irkutsk Oblast
Ivanovo Oblast
Jewish Autonomous Oblast
Kabardino-Balkar Republic
Kaliningrad Oblast
Kaluga Oblast
Karachay-Cherkess Republic
Kemerovo Oblast
Khabarovsk Krai
Kirov Oblast
Komi Republic
Kostroma Oblast
Krasnodar Krai
Krasnoyarsk Krai
Kurgan Oblast
Kursk Oblast
Leningrad Oblast
Lipetsk Oblast
Magadan Oblast
Mari El Republic
Moscow
Moscow Oblast
Murmansk Oblast
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast
Novgorod Oblast
Novosibirsk Oblast
Omsk Oblast
Orenburg Oblast
Oryol Oblast
Penza Oblast
Perm Krai
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0.1833
0.6966
0.5595
0.0043
0.0949
-0.2768
0.1537
1.4431
0.0086
0.5925
0.1606
0.4169
-0.2888
0.2920
0.0400
-0.2432
0.0765
0.5270
0.0606
0.6783
0.0528
0.2829
0.7809
0.0691
-0.0122
0.5848
0.3076
0.9795
0.2224
1.4396
0.1973
0.6103
0.0757
0.3955
0.4884
-1.0204
0.5634
0.1527
-0.0830
0.2784

***
***
***

***
**
***
***
**
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
**
***

0.0706
0.0689
0.0705
0.0684
0.0690
0.0681
0.0696
0.0780
0.0681
0.0696
0.0684
0.0689
0.0683
0.0688
0.0682
0.0685
0.0693
0.0695
0.0681
0.0719
0.0681
0.0687
0.0713
0.0680
0.0685
0.0711
0.0703
0.0729
0.0681
0.0784
0.0691
0.0707
0.0693
0.0689
0.0689
0.0690
0.0700
0.0684
0.0681
0.0832

2.6000
10.1200
7.9400
0.0600
1.3700
-4.0700
2.2100
18.4900
0.1300
8.5100
2.3500
6.0500
-4.2300
4.2400
0.5900
-3.5500
1.1000
7.5800
0.8900
9.4300
0.7800
4.1200
10.9600
1.0200
-0.1800
8.2200
4.3800
13.4400
3.2700
18.3700
2.8500
8.6300
1.0900
5.7400
7.0800
-14.7800
8.0500
2.2300
-1.2200
3.3500
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Primorsky Krai
Pskov Oblast
Republic of Adygea
Republic of Bashkortostan
Republic of Buryatia
Republic of Dagestan
Republic of Ingushetia
Republic of Kalmykia
Republic of Karelia
Republic of Khakassia
Republic of Mordovia
Republic of North Ossetia-Alania
Republic of Tatarstan
Rostov Oblast
Ryazan Oblast
Saint Petersburg
Sakha (Yakutia) Republic
Sakhalin Oblast
Samara Oblast
Saratov Oblast
Smolensk Oblast
Stavropol Krai
Sverdlovsk Oblast
Tambov Oblast
Tomsk Oblast
Tula Oblast
Tuva Republic
Tver Oblast
Tyumen Oblast
Udmurt Republic
Ulyanovsk Oblast
Vladimir Oblast
Volgograd Oblast
Vologda Oblast
Voronezh Oblast
Yaroslavl Oblast

0.6523
-0.1385
-0.3014
0.1322
0.4903
-0.3589
-0.6284
0.2995
0.2370
0.3413
0.1030
-0.4831
0.3109
-0.1984
0.1480
0.2135
1.2646
1.2520
0.5176
0.2564
-0.1167
-0.0276
0.1140
-0.2128
0.4868
-0.1869
0.2575
0.1392
1.7092
0.3011
0.0218
0.1398
-0.0910
0.5462
0.0132
0.1399

Number of observations
Number of groups
Adjusted R-squared
Within R-squared
Between R-squared
Overall R-squared
F test (prob>F)
Breusch & Pagan test (prob>chi2)

693

***
**
***
*
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
**
***
***
***
***
***
*

***
***
***
***
**
***
***
**
***
**

0.0689
0.0681
0.0689
0.0691
0.0684
0.0686
0.0768
0.0692
0.0694
0.0687
0.0686
0.0686
0.0703
0.0683
0.0684
0.0756
0.0740
0.0746
0.0716
0.0685
0.0684
0.0681
0.0698
0.0682
0.0709
0.0683
0.0707
0.0684
0.0843
0.0688
0.0681
0.0682
0.0687
0.0749
0.0682
0.0691

9.4600
-2.0300
-4.3700
1.9100
7.1700
-5.2300
-8.1800
4.3300
3.4200
4.9700
1.5000
-7.0400
4.4200
-2.9100
2.1600
2.8300
17.1000
16.7900
7.2300
3.7400
-1.7100
-0.4100
1.6300
-3.1200
6.8700
-2.7300
3.6400
2.0400
20.2900
4.3700
0.3200
2.0500
-1.3300
7.2900
0.1900
2.0200

77
0.8958
0.8360
1.0000
0.9076
0.0000
0.0000

Source: Author's estimation.
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Table 10A: Regression of poverty for Russia in 2000-2008
Pooled OLS/ Random Effect (RE)
Coef.
Std.error t-value
Log of real GRP per capita
-0.5252 *** 0.0508
-10.3300
Log of real Gov.spending per
capita
-0.0110
0.0174
-0.6300
18.5000
Constant
9.0275
*** 0.4880
Region
Altai Republic
Amur Oblast
Arkhangelsk Oblast
Astrakhan Oblast
Belgorod Oblast
Bryansk Oblast
Chelyabinsk Oblast
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug
Chuvash Republic
Irkutsk Oblast
Ivanovo Oblast
Jewish Autonomous Oblast
Kabardino-Balkar Republic
Kaliningrad Oblast
Kaluga Oblast
Karachay-Cherkess Republic
Kemerovo Oblast
Khabarovsk Krai
Kirov Oblast
Komi Republic
Kostroma Oblast
Krasnodar Krai
Krasnoyarsk Krai
Kurgan Oblast
Kursk Oblast
Leningrad Oblast
Lipetsk Oblast
Magadan Oblast
Mari El Republic
Moscow
Moscow Oblast
Murmansk Oblast
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast
Novgorod Oblast
Novosibirsk Oblast
Omsk Oblast
Orenburg Oblast
Oryol Oblast
Penza Oblast
Perm Krai
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0.1978
0.3952
0.0912
-0.1643
-0.1754
-0.2381
-0.1514
0.4713
0.0045
0.2085
0.2682
0.2442
-0.1666
0.0032
-0.1035
-0.1201
-0.2732
0.1169
0.0011
0.0607
-0.0334
0.0814
0.2060
0.0751
-0.1381
0.2103
-0.1265
0.2510
0.2658
0.3764
-0.1380
0.0744
-0.1660
0.0956
0.2020
-0.6938
0.1967
-0.0063
-0.0754
-0.0529

***
***
***
***
***
**
***
***
***
***
***
*
***
***
*

***

***
*
***
***
***
**

***
***
***

0.0617
0.0652
0.0731
0.0613
0.0644
0.0594
0.0660
0.1062
0.0593
0.0689
0.0603
0.0618
0.0605
0.0647
0.0607
0.0607
0.0673
0.0698
0.0596
0.0816
0.0598
0.0623
0.0789
0.0593
0.0607
0.0698
0.0715
0.0883
0.0595
0.1129
0.0666
0.0765
0.0638
0.0651
0.0648
0.0662
0.0685
0.0611
0.0593
0.0780

3.2100
6.0600
1.2500
-2.6800
-2.7200
-4.0100
-2.2900
4.4400
0.0800
3.0300
4.4500
3.9500
-2.7600
0.0500
-1.7000
-1.9800
-4.0600
1.6800
0.0200
0.7400
-0.5600
1.3100
2.6100
1.2700
-2.2800
3.0100
-1.7700
2.8400
4.4700
3.3300
-2.0700
0.9700
-2.6000
1.4700
3.1200
-10.4900
2.8700
-0.1000
-1.2700
-0.6800
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Primorsky Krai
Pskov Oblast
Republic of Adygea
Republic of Bashkortostan
Republic of Buryatia
Republic of Dagestan
Republic of Ingushetia
Republic of Kalmykia
Republic of Karelia
Republic of Khakassia
Republic of Mordovia
Republic of North Ossetia-Alania
Republic of Tatarstan
Rostov Oblast
Ryazan Oblast
Saint Petersburg
Sakha (Yakutia) Republic
Sakhalin Oblast
Samara Oblast
Saratov Oblast
Smolensk Oblast
Stavropol Krai
Sverdlovsk Oblast
Tambov Oblast
Tomsk Oblast
Tula Oblast
Tuva Republic
Tver Oblast
Tyumen Oblast
Udmurt Republic
Ulyanovsk Oblast
Vladimir Oblast
Volgograd Oblast
Vologda Oblast
Voronezh Oblast
Yaroslavl Oblast

0.3655
-0.2112
-0.1038
-0.1893
0.3023
-0.1805
0.0615
0.4122
-0.1391
0.1239
0.0938
-0.4170
-0.1842
-0.2683
-0.0098
-0.2556
0.4326
0.4416
0.0752
0.0913
-0.2387
-0.0375
-0.2510
-0.2860
-0.0098
-0.3244
0.3405
-0.0211
0.4131
0.0439
0.0204
0.0632
-0.2702
0.0506
-0.0600
-0.1762

Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

-0.0636
-0.1617
-0.2521
-0.3114
-0.3818
-0.4432
-0.4756
-0.5120

Number of observations
Number of groups
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***
***
*
*
***
***

**

0.0648
0.0597
0.0624
0.0661
0.0617
0.0617
0.0892
0.0611
0.0683
0.0626
0.0598
0.0601
0.0742
0.0598
0.0611
0.0773
0.0952
0.0945
0.0730
0.0613
0.0605
0.0594
0.0683
0.0598
0.0748
0.0607
0.0621
0.0611
0.1321
0.0639
0.0593
0.0598
0.0618
0.0780
0.0598
0.0659

5.6400
-3.5400
-1.6600
-2.8600
4.9000
-2.9200
0.6900
6.7400
-2.0400
1.9800
1.5700
-6.9400
-2.4800
-4.4900
-0.1600
-3.3100
4.5400
4.6700
1.0300
1.4900
-3.9400
-0.6300
-3.6800
-4.7800
-0.1300
-5.3400
5.4800
-0.3500
3.1300
0.6900
0.3400
1.0600
-4.3700
0.6500
-1.0000
-2.6700

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

0.0209
0.0221
0.0239
0.0273
0.0307
0.0362
0.0413
0.0450

-3.0400
-7.3100
-10.5700
-11.4100
-12.4500
-12.2400
-11.5200
-11.3700

***
**
**
***
**
***
***
***
***

***
***
***
***
***
***

***

693
77
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Adjusted R-squared
Within R-squared
Between R-squared
Overall R-squared
F test (prob>F)
Breusch & Pagan test (prob>chi2)

0.9208
0.8770
1.0000
0.9307
0.0000
0.0000

Source: Author's estimation.
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